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BOOK REVIEWS 
WHERE ANGELS FEAR TO 'IREAD: RELIGION 
AND THE "PuBLIC SQUARE" 
LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN* 
THE CULTURE OF DISBEUEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND 
POUTICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION. By STEPHEN L. 
CARTER. New York: BasicBooks. 1993. Pp. 328. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Writing in 1962, historian Richard Hofstadter decried the anti-in-
tellectualism plaguing 1950s America. l Though "anti-intellectualism" 
was not a new development, during that decade the term became "a 
familiar part of our national vocabulary .... "2 The 1952 presidential 
election epitomized the contrast "between intellect and philistinism," 
with Democratic candidate Adlai Stevenson, possessed of an "uncom-
mon mind and style," facing Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower, "con-
ventional in mind [and] relatively inarticulate."3 Eisenhower handily 
won the election, a victory that only confirmed the growing belief that 
the intellect's voice was not welcome in America's "public square."4 
* B.A., Connecticut College; J.D., Boston College Law School. Lawrence Friedman is cur-
rently a law clerk to the justices of the New Hampshire Superior Court The author gratefully 
acknowledges the assistance of Jay Shepherd, Robert Gosselink, and the editorial board of the 
Boston College Third World Law JournaL 
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1 RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE (1963). 
2 [d. at 3. Hofstadter continued: 
In the past, American intellectuals were often discouraged or embittered by the 
national disrespect for the mind, but it is hard to recall a time when large numbers 
of people outside the intellectual community shared their concern, or when self-
criticism on this count took on the character of a nationwide movement. 
3 [d. at 3-4. Against Eisenhower's simple promise to "go to Korea," Stevenson "could offer 
little but eloquent intellectualism and a defense of the Democratic administrations ... being 
blamed for all the difficulties the country found itself in." WILLIAM H. CHAFE, THE UNFINISHED 
JOURNEY: AMERICA SINCE WORLD WAR II, at 138 (1986). 
4 The "public square" refers to the "arena in which our public moral and political battles are 
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In 1992, a superficially similar contrast presented itself in the 
opposing presidential candidates. On one side, as embodied in its 
champion, George Bush, the Republican Party appealed to the reli-
gious right by advocating "prayer in public schools, severe restrictions 
on abortion, [and] discrimination against homosexuals .... "5 On the 
other side, Bill Clinton and the Democrats offered a message of simple 
toleration without any overt religious endorsement. Clinton prevailed, 
perhaps because of the unanticipated reaction to what many Ameri-
cans perceived as the politics of hatred and division espoused by the 
Republicans at their 1992 convention.6 
The 1992 election may be symptomatic of the antireligious senti-
ment that currently pervades American discourse. Many consider faith 
and worship as "hobbies," and treat religious views with thinly veiled 
contempt in the "public square."7 America's current aversion to includ-
ing the religious voice in the cacophony of public debate may be 
compared with the emotionalism of the midcentury's anti-intellectual 
movement. But the anti-intellectualism of the 1950s had firm roots in 
America's past, while the modern disregard for religion is a relatively 
recent development. Indeed, religion has played an essential part in 
American society since Colonial times. Religion helped to shape the 
early law of the country, functioning as "a unifying force in the colonial 
experience."8 Its impact is not simply a memory of the distant past: 
religion thrived in American life as recently as the 1950s.9 Even today, 
Americans remain a religious people. lO 
Yet religion as an institution finds itself besieged, not for sponsor-
ing unpopular views, such as those elaborated at the 1992 Republican 
fought" STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAw AND POLITICS 
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 51 (1993). As a forum for debate and discourse, the "public 
square" represents an aspect of the abstract "marketplace of ideas," and its very existence likewise 
"rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public .... " Associated Press v. United States, 
326 U.S. 1,20 (1945). 
5 CARTER, supra note 4, at 49. 
6 Or, perhaps, Clinton won because Americans genuinely desired change from the Republi-
can excesses of the previous 12 years. Answering this question is, naturally, beyond the scope of 
this Review. 
7 See CARTER, supra note 4, at 25-26,51-56. 
8KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAw IN AMERICAN HISTORY 14 (1989). Though 
churches were "significantly less important as legal institutions than in England," the "law of God 
and the Bible" nonetheless functioned as sources of Colonial law. Id. at 26. Early Americans 
"looked to their churches as institutions of conflict resolution and social control." Id. 
9 See CHAFE, supra note 3, at 120-21. Ironically, this was the period when anti-intellectualism 
was at its peak. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. 
10 1993 surveys show that a majority of Americans believe in God, and a large number 
regularly attend worship services. See CARTER, supra note 4, at 4, 279 n.2. 
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Convention, but simply because these views are religious. ll The current 
assaults target religion itself rather than the agendas with which the 
name of religion has come to be associated. In The Culture of Disbelief: 
How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion, Stephen L. 
Carterl2 suggests that "[t]he trouble with the attacks on the 1992 
Republican Convention is that most of them were misdirected"; the 
causes, not the religion, "should have been the object of criticism. "13 
This position is a difficult one. The resurgence of the Christian 
movement in the right wing of the Republican Party resembled an 
effort to turn back the clock of American social and political progress. 
But Carter's point is well taken. In our collective desire to prevent 
religion from commingling with the state and dominating our politics, 
''we have created a political and legal culture that presses the religiously 
faithful to be other than themselves, to act publicly, and sometimes 
privately as well, as though their faith does not matter to them."14 
Carter speaks of more than simply encouraging tolerance of differing 
religious views. He disdains a society that emphasizes the "right to 
believe," but encourages the faithful to keep their beliefs to them-
selves.15 Moreover, Carter argues that the religious be allowed entry to 
the "public square," because religions function as natural and essential 
"bulwarks against state authority. "16 
In exploring these ideas throughout The Culture of Disbelief, Carter 
considers "the case for taking religion seriously as an aspect of the lives 
and personas of the tens of millions of Americans who insist that 
religion is for them of first importance."17 In the book's first section, 
II Like Carter, this Review uses the term "religion" to refer to "a tradition of group worship 
(as against individual metaphysic) that presupposes the existence of a sentience beyond the 
human and capable of acting outside of the observed principles and limits of natural science, 
and, further, a tradition that makes demands of some kind on its adherents." Id. at 17. 
12 Stephen L. Carter is William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law at Yale University School 
of Law. In addition to numerous articles, he is also the author of REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION BABY (1991). 
13 CARTER, supra note 4, at 49. 
14 Id. at 3. 
15Id. at 25. 
16Id. at 36-37. In this suggestion, Carter is not alone. Robert]. Araujo, SJ., similarly advocates 
a public role for religion, consistent with constitutional limitations. He argues that "our secular 
public society can engage both religious people and religious organizations in public discourse 
that can lead us to more and better answers to the problems that we as individuals and commu-
nities face today." Robert]. Araujo, A Dialogue Between the Church and Caesar: A Contemporary 
Interpretation of the Religion Clauses, 34 B.C. L. REv. 493, 527 (1993). Michael W. McConnell also 
deplores the ways in which "serious religion," that is, "religion understood as more than ceremony, 
as the guiding principle of life" has been marginalized in American life. Michael W. McConnell, 
Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115, 126 (1992). 
17 CARTER, supra note 4, at 15. 
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Carter discusses the ways in which American culture has come to 
trivialize religion and thereby undermine its function as a necessary 
mediating force between the people and the state. IS Therein, he notes 
the American tendency to belittle religious devotion as somehow less 
"rational" and therefore more dangerous than nonreligious behavior.19 
Next, he addresses how politicians on both the political left and the 
political right have contributed to the deterioration of religion's role 
in American life, and how more powerful religions oppress those with 
less power.20 In the book's final section, Carter turns to ways that liberal 
theory might comfortably encompass religious views in the American 
"public square."21 He then examines the impact of religious viewpoints 
in some of the most controversial issues currently facing American 
society: euthanasia, abortion, and the death penalty.22 Carter concludes 
by contemplating alternatives for the future of law, politics, and reli-
gion.23 
Carter devotes the core of his book to a discussion of the consti-
tutional status of religion and the religion clauses of the First Amend-
ment.24 In addition to illustrating Carter's thesis that the law has con-
tributed to the marginalization of religion in American society, this 
section also provides an opportunity to test Carter's ideas and sugges-
tions with real-world examples. The examples are presented by two 
religion cases from the 1992-93 Supreme Court term, decided after 
Carter had completed his book.25 Accordingly, this Review first ad-
dresses religious freedom and the Free Exercise Clause by discussing 
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah. 26 It then considers 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District27 and the constitutionally 
mandated separation of church and state. This Review then concludes 
with general observations about Carter's work and about religion in 
America. 
181d. at 23-43. 
191d. 
20ld. at 44-101. 
21 ld. at 213-62. 
221d. at 233-62. 
231d. at 263-77. 
241d. at 105-210. The First Amendment states in pertinent part that "Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment ofreligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. ... " U.S. 
CON ST. amend. I. 
25 Carter mentioned the Court's decision in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of 
Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993), in a brieffootnote. See CARTER, supra note 4, at 124 n. *. He has 
since written more extensively about the decision. See Stephen L. Carter, Comment: The Resurrec-
tion of Religious Freedom?, 107 HARV. L. REv. 118 (1993). 
26 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993). 
27 113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993). 
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II. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
"To be consistent with the Founders' vision and coherent in mod-
ern religiously pluralistic America," Carter writes, "the religion clauses 
should be read to help avoid tyranny-that is, to sustain and nurture 
the religions as independent centers of power [and as] democratic 
intermediaries .... "28 To this end, courts must do more than simply 
protect religion against overt discrimination.29 This ideal has become 
increasingly speculative. The Supreme Court has consistently looked 
"askance at claims of a free exercise right to violate laws that everyone 
else must obey."30 In its most notorious decision on the subject, Employ-
ment Division v. Smith,31 the Court held that an antidrug law that 
incidentally banned the use of peyote during Native American Church 
rituals did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.32 In this ruling, the 
Court chose not to apply strict scrutiny to what it considered a neutral, 
generally applicable law.33 
The import of the Court's decision in Smith was twofold. First, it 
had the effect of reinforcing the continued dominance of accepted, 
"majority" religions in America.34 Indeed, "not a single religious ex-
emption claim has ever reached the Supreme Court from a main-
stream Christian religious practitioner" because mainstream Christian-
ity "does not need judicial help .... "35 Legislatures do not enact laws 
offensive to mainstream religious organizations because most legisla-
tors are members of mainstream religions; therefore, laws that have 
the "incidental effect" of burdening religion virtually never impact on 
the lawmakers themselves. 
28 CARTER, supra note 4, at 124. 
29Carter acknowledges that "[m]ore and more, the American answer, as with all tough 
questions, is to let the courts do it." [d. at 101. 
30 [d. at 125. 
31 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
32 [d. at 878--80. See also CARTER, supra note 4, at 125. 
33494 U.S. at 886. 
34 See CARTER, supra note 4, at 126--29. ''The judgment against the Native American Church 
. . . demonstrates that the political process will protect only the mainstream religions, not the 
smaller groups that exist at the margins." [d. at 128 (footnote omitted). Simply put, Smith served 
to "entrench[] patterns of de facto discrimination against minority religions." Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 195,216 (1992). 
35 Sullivan, supra note 34, at 216. Among the "minority" religious exemption claims that have 
reached the Supreme Court and been rejected, are the wearing of a yarmulke by aJewish military 
officer, Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); the attendance atJumu'ah religious services 
by a Muslim prisoner, O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 u.S. 342 (1987); and the preservation of 
sacred Native American religious sites, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 
U.S. 439 (1988). 
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Second, the Smith decision signaled what Carter refers to as the 
"reduction" of religious freedom.36 Such decisions "reduce the scope 
of the Free Exercise Clause until it lacks independent content, forbid-
ding by its own force no more than do the [Constitution's] other 
clauses that protect individual rights .... "37 This reduction also rein-
forces the general marginalization of religion as an entity in American 
society by emphasizing the importance of governance over any per-
ceived obstacles, no matter how small. That the obstacle may be a 
historical religious practice appears to be of little consequence. 
Like Smith, the Court's decision in Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye v. City of Hialeah illustrates the shortcomings of insubstantial judi-
cial review of free exercise claims. The Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye is a nonprofit corporation organized under Florida law in 1973. 
The Church and its congregants practice the Santeria religion, which 
"teaches that every individual has a destiny from God, a destiny fulfilled 
with the aid and energy of [spirits called] orishas."38 The Santeria 
religion finds its basis in "the nurture of a personal relation with the 
orishas, and one of the principal forms of devotion is an animal sac-
rifice. "39 When the Church leased land from the City of Hialeah in 
1987, many citizens reacted with distress, prompting the city council 
to adopt resolutions in the name of preserving the "public morals, 
peace [and] safety" of the community.40 Additional city ordinances 
prohibited religious animal sacrifice and specified criminal penalties 
for violationsY 
The Supreme Court questioned neither Santeria's legitimacy as a 
religion, nor the sincerity of its adherents' beliefs.42 But the Court 
reasoned-correctly-that the ordinances might nonetheless infringe 
upon the freedom of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment. In 
36 See CARTER, supra note 4, at 129-32. 
37Id. at 129. 
38Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217,2222 (1993). The 
Santeria religion originated in the 19th century, an amalgam of traditional African religions and 
elements of Roman Catholicism. Id. 
39Id. 
4°Id. at 2223. 
41 See id. at 2223-24. The city's ordinances applied to any individual or group that killed, 
slaughtered, or sacrificed animals "for any type of ritual, regardless of whether or not the flesh 
or blood of the animal [was] to be consumed." Id. at 2224. The district court upheld the 
ordinances, concluding that compelling governmental interests "fully justifY the absolute prohi-
bition on ritual sacrifice .... " Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 
1467, 1487 (S.D. Fla. 1989). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court's ruling in a brief per curiam opinion. 936 F.2d 586 (11 th Cir. 1991). The court of appeals 
simply concluded that "the ordinances were consistent with the Constitution." Id. 
42 Church oj the Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2225-26. 
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determining the ordinances' constitutionality, the Court applied the 
test from Employment Division v. Smith:. 43 a neutral law of general appli-
cability "need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest 
even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular 
religious practice."44 But if a law is not both neutral and generally 
applicable, it will survive only if the government articulates a compel-
ling interest, and if the law is "narrowly tailored to advance that inter-
est. "45 The Court held that, in this instance, the city ordinances failed 
to satisfY these requirements. 
The ordinances were not neutral because the city enacted them 
to suppress a central element of the Santeria worship service. The 
cumulative effect of the text, history, and operation of the ordinances 
amounted to outright "animosity to Santeria adherents and their reli-
gious practices . . . . "46 The ordinances also were not generally appli-
cable, since the city decided to pursue governmental interests only with 
respect to "conduct with a religious motivation. "47 Because of this, the 
Court concluded that the ordinances had "every appearance of a 
prohibition that society [was] prepared to impose upon [Santeria 
worshippers] but not upon itself."48 
Only after determining that the ordinances were neither neutral 
nor of general applicability did the Court impose rigorous scrutiny 
upon them, stating that in order to satisfY "the commands of the First 
Amendment," laws restricting religious practice "must advance 'inter-
ests of the highest order'" and must "be narrowly tailored in pursuit 
of those interests."49 Even assuming, arguendo, that the city presented 
compelling interests, it did not draw the ordinances narrowly, for each 
ordinance was "overbroad or underinclusive in substantial respects."50 
The absence of narrow tailoring alone sufficed to establish the ordi-
Id. 
43 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
44113 S. Ct. at 2226. 
45Id. 
46Id. at 2231. As the Court stated: 
the ordinances by their own terms target ... religious exercise; the texts of the 
ordinances were gerrymandered with care to proscribe religious killings of animals 
but to exclude almost all secular killings; and the ordinances suppressed much 
more religious conduct than is necessary in order to achieve the legitimate ends 
asserted in their defense. 
47Id. at 2232. 
48 Id. at 2233 (quoting The florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524, 542 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment». 
49 113 S. Ct. at 2233 (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978), quoting Wisconsin 
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972». 
50 113 S. Ct. at 2233-34. 
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nances' unconstitutionality.51 Moreover, the ordinances lacked any 
compelling governmental interest because they restricted only reli-
gious activity while allowing other substantially similar conduct to con-
tinue unfettered.52 
On the surface, the Court's opinion in Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah appears to be a resounding reaffirmation 
of the constitutional principles supporting a group's right to practice 
its religion, however unusual such practice appears to Western sensi-
bilities. As the Court stated, "[lJegislators may not devise mechanisms, 
overt or disguised, designed to persecute or oppress a religion or its 
practices. "53 Beyond such lofty rhetoric, however, Church of the Lukumi 
clearly represents the exception rather than the norm in free exercise 
cases; the Supreme Court has "overwhelmingly rejected free exercise 
exemption claims," usually by finding "some reason to forego any 
searching judicial scrutiny .... "54 
Church of the Lukumi is the proverbial easy case. Courts do not 
often confront legislation so blatantly designed to single out particular 
religious conduct for prohibition. As Justice Souter observed in his 
concurrence, "the Hialeah City Council has provided a rare example 
of a law actually aimed at suppressing religious exercise .... "55 More 
typically, courts will face a law like that in Smith: formally neutral and 
generally applicable. Justice Souter, recognizing that the Smith rule 
does violence to the meaning and, indeed, the very existence of the 
Free Exercise Clause, would impart the test with some substantive 
meaning. He would define "neutrality" as barring more than facially 
neutral laws-those ''with an object to discriminate against religion"-
by also requiring government "to accommodate religious differences 
by exempting religious practices from formally neutral laws. "56 
Souter's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause would, if 
adopted, necessitate more probing judicial scrutiny in these cases. It 
would allow a reviewing court to determine whether a particular law 
is de facto discriminatory against a "minority" religion by ascertaining 
whether the law operates to "impose [] greater costs on religious than 
51Id. at 2234. 
52Id. A "law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest 'of the highest order' ... when it 
leaves appreciable damage to the supposedly vital interest unprohibited." Id. (quoting The Flarida 
Star, 491 U.S. at 541-42 (Scalia,]., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment». 
53 113 S. Ct. at 2234. 
54 Sullivan, supra note 34, at 215; see also supra note 35. 
55 Church of the Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2243 (Souter,]., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
56Id. at 2241. 
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on comparable nonreligious activities,"57 thereby precluding a religious 
practice and, by extension, undermining "adherence to religious be-
lief."58 In addition to protecting nonmainstream religions, such scru-
tiny would inevitably slow the Free Exercise Clause's "reduction" into 
a hollow incantation, by reaffirming its constitutional place in securing 
an individual's right to practice a particular religious faith. 59 Moreover, 
giving "neutrality" substantive meaning would engender respect for 
religion as religion, rather than treating it "like any other belief. "60 
Naturally, these objectives could also be accomplished by requir-
ing strict scrutiny of free exercise claims from the start, rather than 
requiring a court to first determine that a particular law is not neutral 
and generally applicable.61 As Carter admits, this "is not to say that the 
religions should always win and thus be exempt from the laws that 
apply to everybody else. "62 But the government would have the burden 
of proof to justifY the suppression of religious conduct. A compelling 
interest test would thus help to achieve a functional vision of religion 
"as [an] autonomous moral ... force []" and a bulwark against tyr-
anny.63 
57 Michael W. McConnell & Richard Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious 
Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1,35 (1989). I do not necessarily endorse economic analysis of the 
law, especially where constitutional rights are concerned, and would find such analysis more 
persuasive if it accounted for "human" factors in its legal algorithms. See Robert C. Ellickson, 
Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 
65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 23 (1989). Nevertheless, McConnell and Posner do articulate a simple, 
workable approach to determining "neutrality" in the free exercise context; Justice Souter cited 
to it, supporting his observation that a facially neutral law "may lack neutrality in its effect by 
forbidding something that religion requires or requiring something that religion forbids." Church 
of the Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2241 (Souter,]., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
58Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 469 (1988) (Brennan, 
]., dissenting). 
59 Indeed, scholarship indicates that the Free Exercise Clause "was originally understood to 
preserve a right to engage in activities necessary to fulfill one's duty to one's God, unless those 
activities threatened the rights of others or the serious needs of the State." Church of the Lukumi, 
113 S. Ct. at 2249 (Souter,]., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Thus, there 
exist "powerful" historical reasons "to interpret the Clause ... as applying to all laws prohibiting 
religious exercise infact, and not just those aimed at its prohibition." Id. (emphasis added). 
60 CARTER, supra note 4, at 134. 
61 Four justices in Smith supported requiring "the government to justifY any substantial 
burden on religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by means narrowly 
tailored to achieve that interest." Smith, 494 U.S. at 894 (O'Connor,]., concurring) (emphasis in 
original). Justices Blackmun and O'Connor again advocated a compelling-interest test in Church 
of the Lukumi. See Church of the Lukumi, 113 S. Ct. at 2250 (Blackmun,]., concurI"ing in the 
judgment). 
62 CARTER, supra note 4, at 132. 
63Id. at 134. 
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The Religious Freedom Restoration Act,64 enacted in 1993, would 
change the outcome of cases like Employment Division v. Smith and 
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association. The Act would 
ensure outcomes like that in Church of the Lukumi, by "requir[ing] a 
state to show a compelling interest before it would be able to apply a 
neutral law in a way that interfered with a central aspect of a religious 
practice .... "65 But the Act does not necessarily alter the country's 
vision of the role of religion, for "righ ts become mired in the delicate 
negotiations over statutory drafting," eventually "looking as cramped 
and instrumental as anything else that government does."66 Nor does 
the act undo free exercise jurisprudence so far as the Constitution is 
concerned. Supreme Court decisions like Smith and Lyng still tell us 
that the Constitution has little to do with preventing government from 
restraining uncommon religions, though it forbids government from 
pursuing similar interests with regard to comparable secular moral and 
political institutions. 
III. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
Carter freely acknowledges that not all religious contributions to 
the "public square" are constitutionally permissible under the Estab-
lishment Clause. He rightly criticizes the Supreme Court's lack of a 
coherent Establishment Clause theory, exemplified by the haphazard 
application of the oft-cited Lemon test. Lemon v. Kurtzman67 provided 
that statutes must have a secular purpose, the primary effect of which 
neither enhances nor inhibits religion, nor fosters "an excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion."68 Over the years, a number of 
Supreme Court justices have condemned the test69 without offering an 
alternative that encompasses what Carter views as the Establishment 
64The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 
(1993). 
65 CARTER, supra note 4, at 269; see also Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, § 3(b). 
66CARTER, supra note 4, at 270. 
67 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
68Id. at 613. 
69 As Justice Scalia wrote in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 
(1993), "[Ilike some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and 
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence once again .... " Id. at 2149 (Scalia,]., concurring in the judgment). See also 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist,]., dissenting) (asserting that Lemon is 
"difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results"); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 
736,768 (1976) (White,]., concurring) (Lemon "imposes unnecessary, and ... superfluous tests 
for establishing [constitutional violations]"). 
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Clauses's central purpose: to protect religion from the state, and not 
the state from religion.70 
Liberal political theory posits a world where government remains 
unequivocally neutral in the debate between competing moral and 
theological visions of society.71 Carter's view of the Establishment 
Clause defies traditional liberal thought by breaching the metaphorical 
wall separating church and state.72 Carter's analysis has a historical 
basis; as he notes, unlike many constitutional provisions: 
we actually know a great deal about the history of the Estab-
lishment Clause and about the development of the ideal of a 
separated church and state. We know so much, in fact, that it 
is something of an embarrassment that we so enthusiastically 
ignore our knowledge in our church-and-state jurispru-
dence. 73 
The Framers understood that the role of religion was apolitical, and 
that to fulfill this role, government should not have the opportunity 
to regulate religion. 74 Thus, the Clause should work not to "disable 
religious groups from active involvement" in the "public square," 
but to protect religious liberty from control by the state. 75 For ex-
ample, where the Clause is used as a sword in the fight against 
granting religious nonprofit organizations tax-exempt status, it has 
the incidental effect of empowering the state as the primary actor 
in the "public square." Carter equates such treatment with "tyr-
anny," though "it is called the separation of church and state."76 
Carter advocates an Establishment Clause jurisprudence that "pro-
scribe[s] establishments but would allow support [from government] 
on the same basis as other groupS."77 The result of such an analysis 
70 See CARTER, supra note 4, at 105. 
71 See Michael J. Sandel, Freedom oj Conscience or Freedom oj Choice? in ARTICLES OF FAITH, 
ARTICLES OF PEACE: THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 
74,74-76 (James D. Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990). See also BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIALJUSTICE 
IN THE LIBERAL STATE 345-48, 364 (1980); Sullivan, supra note 34, at 198-99. 
72Justice Black first wrote of the "impregnable wall" between church and state in Everson v. 
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
73 CARTER, supra note 4, at 115. 
74 According to Carter, James Madison's oft-quoted Memorial and Remonstrance frames the 
separation of church and state "principally as a protection of the church, not as a protection of 
the state." Id. at 116. Similarly, Carter interprets Thomas Jefferson as having "shared the general 
view" that "the state had to be prevented from exercising coercive authority over the religions 
.... " Id. at 117. 
75Id. at 123. 
76Id. 
77Id. at 120. 
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would often be the same as the traditional liberal approach: the state 
should not pay for creches or sponsor organized prayer in the class-
room, but religions should "be able to compete on the same grounds 
as other groups for the largess of the welfare state-they should not, on 
Establishment Clause grounds, be relegated to a second-class statuS."78 
Accordingly, Carter would agree with liberal theorists that the Court 
correctly decided Lee v. Weisman,79 which prohibited religious invoca-
tions and benedictions at public high school graduation ceremonies,80 
while probably only Carter would agree with the Court's decision in 
Bowen v. Kendrick,81 which upheld the distribution of federal funds for 
sex education to religious organizations as part of a general grant to 
family planning groups.82 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,83 which concerned the 
placement of a public employee in a sectarian school, represents a 
particularly troubling decision, aptly demonstrating the difficulties in 
consistently adhering to either theory. The case involved James z~ 
brest, who had been deaf since birth. James attended grades six 
through eight at a public school operated by the Catalina Foothills 
School District, which furnished him with a sign-language interpreter. 
For the ninth grade, his parents enrolled him in Salpointe Catholic 
High School, a sectarian institution in which the "two functions of 
secular education and advancement of religious values or beliefs are 
inextricably intertwined .... "84 The school district declined the z~ 
brests' request for an interpreter, fearing that providing an interpreter 
would violate the First Amendment. 85 
The Supreme Court began its opinion by noting that it had never 
stated that "religious institutions are disabled ... from participating in 
publicly sponsored social welfare programs. "86 Rather, the Court has 
78Id. at 12l. 
79112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). 
80The Court held that the religious invocation and benediction represented "a state-spon-
sored and state-directed religious exercise in a public school[,l" because it appeared as though 
the state "decreed that prayers must occur." Id. at 2655. 
81 487 U.S. 589 (1988). 
82The Court held that the federal grants had a "legitimate secular purpose," id. at 602, and 
did not impermissibly advance religion. Id. at 62l. 
83113 S. Ct. 2462 (1993). 
84Id. at 2464 n.l (quotations omitted). 
85Id. at 2464. The district court granted the school district summary judgment, because the 
effect of the interpreter would be to promote religious inculcation at government expense. Id. 
The court of appeals affirmed, applying the three-part test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 
403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971). The court of appeals held that providing James with an interpreter 
would violate Lemon's second prong by having the effect of advancing religion. See Zobrest v. 
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist, 963 F.2d 1190, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 1992). 
86 Zobrest, 113 S. Ct at 2466 (quoting Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609 (1988)). 
1994] BOOK REVIEWS 175 
held that "government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a 
broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not 
readily subject to an Establishment Clause challenge just because sec-
tarian institutions may also receive an attenuated financial benefit. "87 
Applying this standard to the facts, the Court reasoned that because 
the service at issue was "part of a general government program that 
distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as 'handi-
capped,"'88 without regard to the religious nature of the school, it was 
simply a neutral service offered as a part of a general program "in no 
way skewed towards religion .... "89 Nor did the physical presence of 
a public employee in the classroom create a constitutional problem, 
because the government's provision of an interpreter did not relieve 
the school "of an expense that it otherwise would have assumed in 
educating its students. "90 
The Court's decision in ZolJrestoffends traditional liberal thinking: 
it is doubtful whether the state could be any less neutral toward religion 
than by placing a public employee at the disposal of sectarian masters. 
Such a placement promotes religion, in violation of the second prong 
of the Lemon test,91 by making the public employee "the conduit for 
... religious education .... ''92 Moreover, ZolJrest is antithetical to the 
idea that the Establishment Clause should "protect[] individuals from 
compulsory financial support of other people's religion ... .''93 The 
purpose of a liberal reading of the Clause is to encourage a "public 
square" with a theoretically even playing field, upon which no particu-
lar faith has an advantage over any other. The price of such an ap-
proach is an "asymmetrical treatment" of religion as compared to other 
moral and political institutions, denying religion the state's financial 
support while allowing it for similar secular institutions.94 
The traditional liberal approach to ZolJrest would prevent the pro-
vision of a public employee to the sectarian school, in effect preventing 
religion from claiming its share of government largess. But the actual 
decision does not necessarily embrace Carter's vision of the Estab-
lishment Clause; if anything, it works to negate religion's role as an 
intermediary force in American life. As Justice Blackmun noted, the 
87 Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2466. 
88Id. at 2467. 
89Id. (quoting Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 u.s. 481, 488 (1986)). 
90 Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2469. 
91 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 u.s. 602,612-13 (1971); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. 
Dist., 963 F.2d 1190, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 1992). See also CARTER, supra note 4, at 122 (discussing 
Lemon as applied to funding a hypothetical religiously sponsored treatment program). 
92 Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2474 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). 
93 Sullivan, supra note 34, at 209-10. 
94 See id. at 212-13. 
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case involved nothing less than enlisting "the machinery of the State 
to enforce a religious orthodoxy."95 The situation entailed "ongoing, 
daily, and intimate governmental participation in the teaching and 
propagation of religious doctrine."96 Thus, Zobrest does not represent 
a genuine recognition of religion's independent character, for it envi-
sions a sharing of responsibilities between government and religion 
that can only work to undermine religious autonomy. As the Court 
stated in Engel v. Vitale, the "union of government and religion tends 
to destroy government and to degrade religion. "97 
Articulating a coherent Establishment Clause constitutionalism is 
no small task. Though Carter would advise that religions be treated 
like any secular group, he admits that such treatment opens the door 
to potential state regulation.98 It is doubtful whether any court would 
ever allow the state to become involved in the actual administration of 
a particular religion, but it is well established that where government 
provides funding, it may also impose conditions.99 In the end, then, a 
traditional liberal reading of the Establishment Clause, as informed by 
Carter's analysis, may offer the soundest approach to cases like Zobrest. 
To review: in order to insure a common baseline in the "public 
square," so that no single religious voice may drown out another, the 
state must act neutrally, neither promoting nor inhibiting religion; this 
discourages the state from capitalizing upon its regulatory power to 
religion's detriment. In essence, the state discriminates against all 
religions, because they may not partake of the benefits available to 
their secular counterparts. But religions, released from the threat of 
state incursion, are consequently freer to function as the Framers 
envisioned: to discover and argue "meanings that are in competition 
with those imposed by the state. "lOO Of course, this balancing is not 
perfect, but neither is the world in which we live. Demanding a perfect 
modern constitutionalism where so many interests conflict seems, if 
not unreasonable, at least somewhat disingenuous. 
95 Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2474 (Blackmun,j., dissenting) (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 
2649,2658 (1992)). 
96 Zobrest, 113 S. Ct. at 2474. 
97 370 u.s. 421, 431 (1962). 
98 See CARTER, supra note 4, at 145-52. 
99 In both the free speech and abortion rights contexts, the Supreme Court has held consti-
tutional government's power, within rather broad limits, to condition the use of federal funds. 
See Rustv. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1772-75 (1991). 
l()() CARTER, supra note 4, at 273. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Culture of Disbeliefis a challenging book for many reasons, not 
the least of which is that it presents a view of religion's role in demo-
cratic society that appears to subvert liberal orthodoxy. Though Car-
ter's charge is formidable, he succeeds both in surveying the modern 
condition of religion and in convincingly arguing that entree into the 
"public square" should not necessarily be conditioned upon separating 
one's faith from one's self. While this Review has focused on Carter's 
analysis of the religion clauses of the Constitution, that is not to say 
that the answers to the questions of religion's role in society are to be 
found exclusively within the judicial system. As Carter notes, "the 
ultimate security of religious liberty lies not in judges' opinions but in 
citizens' commitments .... "101 It is in the give-and-take of the market-
place of ideas that the parameters of religious involvement in American 
discourse will be decided, and it is in the local political arena that the 
power of any particular religious group will be tested.102 
Though Carter writes persuasively, especially in discussing the 
in tersection of religion and the law, the reader may remain unsure that 
in the ebb and flow of American life, religion's current "state of repose" 
should be cause for great alarm. Americans are historically not only a 
religious people, but also a wary people; we share a worldview descend-
ed from the American Revolution, and based on suspicion. Among 
other things, Americans are suspicious of "far-removed and energetic 
government, of manipulators of money, of taxes [and] of the use of 
force at home or abroad. "103 Perhaps it is this healthy suspicion that 
ultimately keeps tyranny in check. Certainly, as between religion and 
the state, our suspicion plays no favorites. 
101 Id. at 145. 
102 See id. at 267-68. 
103 Gordon S. Wood, America in the 1790s, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1993, at 138 (reviewing 
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